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Abstract 
This study examined the relationship between the capital structure of diversified companies and their diversification 
degree in different levels of financing constraint. After controlling the firm size, growth power as well as other variables 
which also have great impact on the financing structure decision of the company, we find out from the empirical results that 
the effects of diversification degree on capital structure are disparate for firms facing different financing constraints. For 
companies that are in extremely terrible solvency condition, the leverage ratio is negatively related to the diversification 
degree. While for companies that face less debt financing constraint, the leverage is positively related to diversification 
degree.  
 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and peer-review under responsibility of Desheng Dash Wu 
 
Keywords:Diversification degree ; Capital structure decisions; Financing constraint; Financial engineering 
1. Introduction 
With the industrial competition getting fiercer and fiercer, diversification strategy has become one of the 
major ways advocated by Chinese companies to expand scale and seek new opportunities. However, due to the 
misunderstanding and misapplication of diversification strategy, enterprises suffered great losses in search for 
diversification, for which the diversification strategy was once regarded as a terrible trap. Therefore, how to 
implement an effective diversification strategy and the impact of such a strategic choice on financial decisions 
become important issues faced by businesses and academic research in the area of investment and financing 
engineering. As corporate diversification strategy involves business expansion, business diversification process 
requires additional resources to support the company operating in different business units, among which 
funding is the most important one. Thus external financing may always be schemed in this process. Therefore, 
the unreasonable structure of corporate finance and the lack of financing capacity have become key limits of 
implementation of diversification strategy. In turn, the choice of diversification strategy is also doom to 
influence the capital structure decision because of the different financing behavior under the disparate financing 
condition. Researches on the relationship between diversification and capital structure in different level of
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financing constraints have essential practical significance. 
Tracing the historical development of the company, it can be said that since the emergence of corporate 
financing activities, capital structure has become an important issue that the company must consider. This is 
because that the capital structure has a direct impact on the company's financing costs, thereby affecting the 
company performance. Since the early work of Modigliani and Miller (1958) 1on capital structure irrelevance 
to corporate value was proposed, there have been considerable studies of capital structure and its impact on firm 
value. Harris and Raviv(1991) in a review of the general capital structure literature reported that the consensus 
is that leverage is positively related to fixed assets, non-debt tax shields, investment opportunities and firm size, 
but negatively related to volatility, advertising expenditure, the probability of bankruptcy, profitability, and the 
uniqueness of the product2. Li and Li (1996) argued that diversified firms need to carry greater leverage to 
maximize firm value3, and they cited the evidence in Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) to support their theory4. 
Although MM is still the bases of modern corporate financial theory, it is obvious that there is a definite link 
between financing costs and the company value. Thus how to make capital structure decisions and how to 
explain the difference of individual enterprises capital structure in the same macro-economic environment and 
industry background attracted great attention from both academic researches, which resulted in Trade-off 
Theory, Signal Transmission Theory, Control Theory, Information Asymmetry and Capital Structure 
Motivation Theory. But little concern is given from the perspective of strategy. Thus, Scholars began to explore 
from all aspects. This article attempts to explain the disparate of capital structure of listed companies from the 
perspective of diversification. 
2. Literature Review 
Study on the relationship between capital structure and diversification strategy started in the early 1970s. Up 
to now, there are two categories of arguments or theories were proposed in this area, coinsurance effect theory 
and agency cost theory. Based on the ideas of these two theories, some empirical studies are made but the 
results are not consistent. 
2.1 Coinsurance effect  
Lewellen (1971) argued that combining businesses with imperfectly correlated cash flow streams provides a 
coinsurance effect that creates more capacity for debt. He thought that even though diversification may destroy 
value and profit ability, its negative effect may be partially offset by an increased debt capacity and resulting tax 
shields income.5 Cross border diversification appears to improve shareholder wealth, and the coinsurance effect 
may be a partial explanation for this improvement (Eun, Koloday, & Scheraga, 1996)6. Chkir and Cosset(2001) 
also claimed that the group composed of the least diversified MNCs is less leveraged than the three other 
groups of MNCs and the MNCs with a high level of international diversification face higher agency costs of 
debt and the combination of both types of diversification leads to lower levels of operating risk. Although the 
role of the determinants of MNC capital structure varies with the diversification strategy, there seem to be 
common determinants. In particular, profitability and operating risk are negatively related to the debt ratio of 
MNCs7.While Pek Yee Low and Kung H. Chen(2004) found that the US firms prefers lower debt to pursue 
higher international diversification8.  
2.2 Agency cost theory  
Li and Li (1996) argued the combination of diversification with low leverage leads to over investment，and 
stimulate problem of asset substitution. Thus, to maximize shareholder wealth, diversified firms may prefer 
greater debt ratio than non-diversified firms. They, however, questioned the robustness of this finding because 
the relation between leverage and diversification did not appear to be as consistent when they measured 
diversification with the Herfindahl index3. The empirical evidence suggested that diversified companies have 
lower debt ratios than focused corporations (Shapiro, 1978; Michel & Shaked, 1986; Lee & Kwok, 1988; 
Burgman, 1996; Chenetal, 1997; Manohar, 2003)9-14. Ethier (1996) and Horn (1990) argued that 
internationalization is a way to intangible assets15-16. Diversified companies would have lower leverage 
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because they carry proportionately more intangible assets in their asset base. Chen(1997) argued that diversified 
companies have higher bankruptcy costs and agency costs of debt. These higher costs would reduce the optimal 
amount of debt for diversified companies. Kim and Lyn(1986) suggested that "diversified companies often 
outperform local companies in host countries and have more growth opportunities.17 Since Stulz (1990) found 
that "leverage is negatively related to growth opportunities, one would expect that leverage would be lower for 
diversified companies than for focused companies. It is not a new idea that growth and leverage would be 
inversely related18. Myers (1977) argued that "growth opportunities can be viewed as call options, and he 
shows that issuing risky debt reduces the present value of a firm holding these options19. Thus, he predicted 
that corporate borrowing will be inversely related to these options for growth. These theories made different 
explanations from different perspectives. Fiaschi (2009) argued that leverage fails to control for the amount of 
cash the manager can misappropriate in personal projects. He tested this proposition on a panel of non–financial 
UK firms, by investigating the determinants of firms’ performance and allowing for endogeneity of capital 
structure decisions.20 By taking the environment into account, Elizabeth Ngah-Kiing Lim , Shobha S. Das, 
Amit Das(2009) found out that firms pursuing unrelated product diversification took on less debt financing in 
stable environments, but more debt financing in dynamic environments. There was a reciprocal relationship 
between a firm's product diversification strategy and its debt financing level.21 
 Given the relevant research results above, they were concentrated on the analysis of effects of diversification 
strategy. However, the financing environment both internal and external is often ignored. If we overlook the 
constraint environment, lack of accurate classification will ensue. In addition, whether by theoretical model or 
empirical analysis, the relationship between different degree of diversity of business and the capital structure 
requires further exploration according to the financing resources of company. Thus, it is pivotal to develop 
financing decision-making relation, and explore enterprises financing behavior under different financing 
conditions. 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Sample  selection  and  data  sources 
To investigate the effect of diversification strategy on capital structure, the basic data are the financial data of 
the listed companies in Chinese Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchange from the year 2003 to the year 2009 for 
the data we need about the business segments of the company began to be disposed in 2003. All the data are 
obtained from CSMAR database and Tinysoft database software. We also use the company's annual financial 
report provided by Star Web site as a supplement for the data missed in the database. For data processing and 
statistical analysis, we use Excel and SPSS17.0 statistical analysis software.  
There are more than two thousand firms in the initial sample. We excluded financial firms such as banks and 
insurance companies because their debt-like liabilities are not strictly comparable to the debt issued by 
non-financial firms (Rajan and Zingales, 1995)22. As a result, we have a sample of 1364 firms that meet our 
complete data criteria. 
3.2. Variables and Models 
Firm’s capital structure is measured by firm leverage, namely, the ratio of total debt to total assets of the firm. 
We use the number of business segments to define diversity. In the multivariate tests, the Herfindahl index is 
adopted to measure product diversification degree. 
Several control variables are stated to clearly delineate the effect of diversification strategies on capital 
structure by isolating other influential factors on firm leverage. Our choice of control variables is guided by two 
distinct but related theories developed to explain corporate capital structure. According to the Pecking–Order 
theory, informational asymmetries cause high-quality firms to avoid external financing. In this framework, the 
choice of leverage will be a function of investment opportunities and its profitability. More profitable firms may 
finance their growth by utilizing internally generated retained earnings. In contrast, firms with lower 
profitability may need more leverage. Thus, we may see a negative relation between firm performance and 
degree of financial leverage. Firms with profitable growth opportunities may, therefore, use less debt financing. 
So we use firm performance as a control variable. Asset turnover ratio is introduced to capture managerial 
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efficiency in utilization of corporate assets. This variable is also interpreted as indicator of reduced agency costs 
of managerial discretion (Ang, Cole, & Lin, 2000)23. Agency-cost-of-debt model suggests that as a firm’s 
growth opportunities increase, agency-cost of debt in terms of profitable projects foregone (Myers, 1977).  
We also include size as a control variable following Rajan and Zingales (1995) since it captures 
informational asymmetries as well as financial strength of firms. In general, highly profitable slow-growing 
firms should generate the most cash, but less profitable fast-growing firms will need significant external 
financing. Thus, realized growth may affect leverage level of the company. 
All the variables employed in this paper are stated and symbolized as follows and the definition and 
explanation of each are given in table 1. 
Dependent variable. LEV stands for debt ratio, measured as total debt over the sum of total debt and market 
value of equity. Although other measures of a firm’s indebtedness are available, the use of this debt ratio allows 
us to compare our results to those reported in prior studies. 
Independent variable. N=number of business sectors. 
The Herfindahl index is calculated according to equation (1). 
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where Pi is share of the business segment in total firm sales revenue, and n is the number of the firm’s 
business segments. The lower the Herfindahl index, the higher the level of diversification. 
Control variables 
We control for the size of the firm by including the natural log of total book value of firm assets. The variable 
profitability controls for firm-level accounting profitability, as measured by return on assets them. ROA and 
ROE control for the current level of profitability in the firm’s primary industry. We also control for some other 
factors. CAPT controls for enterprise asset management efficiency. This variable is calculated by net sales over 
average working capital. CAPT is an important index to investigate business enterprise assets operation 
efficiency It is manifested the enterprise operating period all assets from the investment to the output of the 
flow speed, and reflects the enterprise all assets management quality and efficiency. Growth is controlled by the 
growth rate of main business income. Fast-growing companies which require a lot of money tend to use more 
debt. 
Table 1  Variables and definitions 
 Variables Definition 
Dependent variable  LEV Debt to asset ratio 
Independent variable N Number of business segments 
HII Herfindahl index  
Control variables  SIZE The natural logarithm of the assets 
ROE Return on common stockholders’ equity   
ROA Return on total Assets  
CAPT Working capital turnover 
 
GROWTH Growth rate of main business income  
In our statistical analysis, we use panel data since what we are going to study may have be influenced not 
only by the characteristics of individual firms but also by macro environment which changes with time. Since 
there is interrelationship between leverage and diversification strategy, we use GMM estimation to avoid 
endogenesis of the independent variable.  
Reviewed above, it suggests the following regression model: 
, 0 1 , 1 2 , 3 , 4
6 , 7 , 8 , ,           
i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t
LEV a LEV HII N SIZE
ROA CAPT GROWTH
b b b b
b b b e
-= + + + + +
+ + + +
, 5 ,i tROEb                            (2) 
183Yan Yang and Jiaju Yang / Systems Engineering Procedia 3 (2012) 179 – 186
Y.Y,et al/ Systems Engineering Procedia  00 (2011) 000–000 
,i te
where LEV is dependent variable; b is for coefficient matrix; HII is for the independent variable and represents 
the relevant factors of influence the capital structure ; N、SIZE、ROE、ROA、CAPT、GROETH represent 
the control variables of the capital structure and reflect the company’s own features.  stands for the random 
error factor. 
3.3 Data Classification 
Table 2  Classification of financing constraints 
Types Types 1  Types 2 Types 3  Types 4 
FCCOV FCCOV≤0 0<FCCOV≤3 3<FCCOV≤10 FCCOV>10
N (279) （336） （410） （339） 
4.Data analysis and Results 
4.1Descriptive analysis 
Table 3  Descriptive statistics of all samples 
FCCOV≤0 0<FCCOV≤3 3<FCCOV≤10 FCCOV>10 
  Var  .LEV 
Means Std. Dev. Means Std. Dev. Means Std. Dev. Means Std. Dev. 
LEV 1.5189 26.0795  0 .6866 0 .66670 0.5255 0 .29038 0.8168 6.5402
SIZE 21.0027 1.3190 21.3439 1.1375 21.5160 1.1566 21.6216 1.4115
ROE -0.0203 1.4315 0.0045 0 .4965 0 .0480 1.1160 -0.0099 1.3587
ROA -0.0396 0.2060 0 .0191 0 .0205 0 .0510 0.0450 0.10823 0.3105
CAPT 2.2433 34.0766 -20.5465 534.5844 12.50826 285.0391 -0.7011 95.6967
GROWTH 0.4554 3.7262 0.4225 3.9318 4.7008 116.5846 0.6026 6.8800
HII 3.5E+14 6.6E+15 2.1E+15 4.1E+16 7.4E+14 2.2E+16 2.1E+14 4.6E+15
N 4.0018 3.0250 4.3820 2.9720 4.3725 3.3342 4.4850 3.5337
 
Analyzing the descriptive analysis results in table 2, we get the following intuitive understandings: 
 The average LEVs of different groups in different financing constraints are quite different, which 
indicates that the financing decision is influenced by financing capability of the company. When FCCOV<0，
financial leverage is comparatively high, which means that the condition of the company is not good. On the 
contrary, the bigger the FCCOV is, the safer the company becomes. The companies of high-leveled financial 
leverage must ensure the FCCOV which can maintain the safe management. 
 Judging from the perspective of SIZE, the companies of high financing constraints are a little smaller 
than companies of low financing constraints, but not so obvious. 
 The number of industries the business set foot in has a mean in the range of [4.0, 4.5].  
 It is also found that, the mean HII is extremely high due to some miscalculation in the statistical 
process. Such abnormal value of HII may have some impact on the accuracy of the empirical analysis. Thus, we 
delete the samples with abnormal value. After deletion of the samples with singular values, the descriptive 
statistical results are presented in Table 2. 
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Table 4  Descriptive statistics of the sample without singular values 
     FCCOV≤0      0<FCCOV≤3      3<FCCOV≤10     FCCOV>10 
Var.   LEV 
Means Std. Dev. Means Std. Dev. Means Std. Dev. Means Std. Dev. 
LEV 1.5189 26.0796 0 .6866 0 .6667 0.5255 0 .2903 0.8168 6.5402 
SIZE 21.0027 1.3190 21.3439 1.1375 21.5160 1.1566 21.6216 1.4115 
ROE -0.0203 1.4316 0.0045 0 .4965 0 .0477 1.1160 -0.0099 1.3587 
ROA -0.0397 0.2060 0 .0191 0 .0205 0 .0510 0.0450 0.10823 0.3105 
CAPT 2.2433 34.0766 -20.5465 534.5844 12.5082 285.0391 -0.7011 95.6967 
GROWTH 0.4554 3.7262 0.4225 3.9318 4.7008 116.5846 0.6026 6.8800 
HII 0.7428 0.4798 0.6962 0.4317 7.2E-01 0.4481 0.7705 0.4682 
N 4.0018 3.0250 4.3820 2.9720 4.3725 3.3342 4.4851 3.5337 
 
From Table 4, it can be concluded HII is fluctuating within a normal range. From the descriptive analysis 
result, we observed that the degree of diversification and leverage are preliminarily negatively related. 
4.2 Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation result 
Table 5  GMM results of model (1) 
FCCOV≤0 0<FCCOV≤3 3<FCCOV≤10 FCCOV>10     LEV       
Var. Coef P>|z| Coef P>|z| Coef P>|z| Coef P>|z| 
LEV L1. 0.8597 0.000 0.91614 0.000 0.3081 0.124 0.6237 0.007 
SIZE -0.7290 0.000 -0.2603 0.001 0.0915 0.000 0.0869 0.002 
 ROE -0.0023 0.868 0.01202 0.636 -0.0016 0.408 0 .0138 0.643 
 ROA -1.3538 0.000 2.5637 0.118 -0.8869 0.005 -0.2900 0.329 
CAPT 0 .0003 0.787 -8.52E-05 0.609 0 .0001 0.536 -6.8E-05 0.628 
GROWTH -0.0044 0.51 -0.0056 0.495 1.4E-06 0.944 0.0043 0.088 
HII 5.8E-17 0.013 -5.06E-17 0.001 -1.3E-17 0.001 -3.0E-18 0.933 
N -0.0146 0.374 -0.0094 0.379 0 .0008 0.553 0 .0029 0.356 
 
The empirical result of model (1) is given in table 5.  From data in this table, we conclude the following 
findings:  
 There is an obvious relationship between LEV and HII, the diversification index.  
 When FCCOV is lower than 0, LEV is positively related to HII. Namely, when the company loses its 
solvency completely, the higher the HII is, the higher the leverage becomes. 
 On the condition of 0<FCCOV≤3 and 3<FCCOV≤10，LEV and HII are negatively correlated. 
 When FCCOV>10，there is no obvious connection between LEV and HII. Because HII is negatively 
related to degree of diversification, it can be reached that: when FCCOV≤0，debt rate is negatively related with 
diversification; when 0<FCCOV≤3 and 3<FCCOV≤10，debt rate is positively related to diversification; when 
FCCOV>10，debt rate has no obviate connection with diversification.  
 Number of business segments has no clear connection with capital structure, which might be due to 
there is no significant difference in the number of diversified operation and leads to the ambiguous result.  
5.Conclusions 
Judging from empirical results, following conclusions can be made: 
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 Diversification of companies is closely related with financing structure, but the relevance of 
diversification degree and capital structure is different in different financing constraints.  
 When the interest coverage ratio is below zero, company loses solvency completely, and falls into 
extremely high financing constraints. Under this kind of circumstance, diversified degree has an obvious 
negative relation with leverage, that is, the leverage is decreasing with the increasing degree of diversification. 
Concerning this phenomenon, we think that it is because of the deprival of capability of debt financing owing to 
the lost solvency.  
 However, to the contrary of the situation of great financial constraint, when the companies are in a 
normal financing condition as the FCCOV is larger than 0 but less than 10, diversification degree gets obviously 
positively related to the capital structure. Namely, debt ratio increases with the degree of diversification; stock 
right financing is correspondingly decreasing. This is because the diversification strategy is a kind of expansion 
of the business, which demands higher capability both financial and managerial. Thus more capital is needed at 
the initial time of strategy implementation. Since the debt financing condition is relatively good, companies 
prefer debt financing as it is easier and quicker to get debt financing.  
 In a condition without any debt financing constraint when FCCOV is larger than 10, there is no 
outstanding influence of diversification on the capital structure of companies. In terms of this phenomenon, we 
can explain from the perspective of financing constraint. As the company does not have any financing 
constrains, they can finance according to its target capital structure by making a proper combination of debt and 
equity.     
6. Limitations and prospects for future research 
This paper investigated the effects of diversification degree on the capital structure under different types of 
debt financing constraints. Even though some meaningful results have been achieved, there are still some 
limitations that need further study. 
We have only discussed one measure for capital structure which can not reflect the condition of capital 
structure in an all-around way. In this way, we can cover other measures such as term structure of debt in our 
research. Second, concerning diversification, we only use Herfindahl index and the number of businesses as the 
measures. However, what is worth studying is the type of diversification strategy because different types of 
diversification require different capabilities and resources thus have different impact on financial decisions. 
Finally, the financing decision under different types of diversification is also worth studying. 
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